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Statement of Issues and Standards of Review 
Amber McKelvey claims that her brothers, Stuart Hamilton and Vincent Hamilton 
(the "Hamilton brothers"), received more of their father's estate than they should have 
under certain findings of fact and conclusions of law entered in 1994 in a separate 
probate action (1994 FFCL). Specifically, Ms. McKelvey complains that the Hamilton 
brothers received $699,460 worth of shares in their father's company, Hamilton Bros. 
Electric, Inc. (the Company), but should have received only $199,680 worth of shares, an 
alleged windfall of $499,780. (AOB at 1.) In explaining this alleged "windfall," 
however, Ms. McKelvey simply ignores those aspects of the 1994 FFCL that undermine 
her windfall assertion. As the district court observed, in light of the entire 1994 FFCL, 
the issues look quite different. 
The 1994 FFCL explains how all estate property was distributed, and undermines 
virtually every claim in the opening brief. In 1994, the value of the estate's assets, 
including the Company, was $1,957,242. (R. 1256.) The estate's liabilities were 
$1,065,577. (R. 1256.) The net value therefore was $891,665. (R. 1255.) The five heirs 
(the Hamilton brothers, Ms. McKelvey, and their two sisters) were to receive 1/5 portions 
of the estate (not merely the Company), which came to $178,333 per heir. Ms. 
McKelvey received $195,000, of which $141,508 was Company stock. (R. 1254.) This 
is more than a 1/5 portion. 
The other two sisters also received $195,000 each, but did not receive the entire 
amount in 1994. Instead, the two sisters made a cash election and were to receive future 
distributions totaling $283,016 (plus 6% interest per year) after the Hamilton brothers had 
sold certain real property in the estate valued at $163,500, property earmarked to help pay 
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not only the two sisters but other estate liabilities. (R. 1253,1256-57.) Importantly, with 
a net value of the estate of $891,665 and the Company valued at $841,000, there was 
only $50,000 of non-Company assets to pay the two sisters their $283,016. The 
Hamilton brothers were therefore required personally to guarantee future payments to the 
two sisters, thereby assuming all risks associated with the real property's future value. 
(R. 1252.) 
Ms. McKelvey's complaint that the Hamilton brothers received more Company 
stock is therefore partially explained by the fact that they were personally responsible for 
(i) estate liabilities and (ii) the $283,016 future payments to the two sisters. The 1994 
FFCL also allowed the Hamilton Brothers to receive a fee as administrators, which they 
also took in Company stock. There was no windfall, only a fortunate upturn in the real 
estate market after 1994 that permitted the Hamilton brothers to pay their two sisters with 
proceeds from the real estate sales while using very little of their own money or having to 
sell their Company stock. 
In the end, the only inequity is that the Hamilton brothers must incur additional 
expense in defending this appeal. The opening brief not only fails to describe the estate 
distributions accurately, but also fails to disclose that Ms. McKelvey is challenging a 
ruling that she urged the district court to make. In the district court, Ms. McKelvey 
asserted that the 1994 FFCL is unambiguous; but on appeal, she argues that the 1994 
FFCL is ambiguous and should be construed against the Hamilton brothers. (R. 1923:47; 
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AOB at 30.) Thus, if the district court erred in ruling the 1994 FFCL is unambiguous, the 
error was invited, and this court should refuse to consider it.1 
With the 1994 FFCL properly construed and the issues on appeal confined only to 
those Ms. McKelvey raised in the district court, the issues look quite different. 
Issue 1: Whether the district court correctly granted summary judgment in favor 
of the Hamilton brothers, where the 1994 FFCL unambiguously specifies that the 
Hamilton brothers were to receive whatever portions of the estate remained after 
(i) distributions to Ms. McKelvey and the two sisters and (ii) payment of all other estate 
obligations, and it is undisputed that the Hamilton brothers received only these portions. 
Standard of Review: "A district court's decision to grant summary judgment is 
reviewed for correctness." Oman v. Davis Sch. Dist, 2008 UT 70. If 14. 194 P.3d 956. 
Issue 2: Whether the district court abused its discretion in enforcing a partial 
settlement agreement where the parties (i) agreed to specific terms; (ii) began performing 
under those specific terms; and (iii) later failed to agree only upon specific language. 
Standard of Review: "[A] trial court's summary enforcement of a settlement 
agreement will not be reversed on appeal unless it is shown that there was an abuse of 
discretion. . . . [WJhether a contract exists between parties is a question of law which we 
review for correctness." John Deere Co. v. A&H Equip., Inc., 876 P.2d 880, 883 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1994). 
1
 Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, 1117, 164 P.3d 366 ("a party cannot take advantage of an 
error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the error"). 
9256306 3 
• Issue 31 Whether the disti ict coin t abused its discretion in (i) excluding evidence 
concerning fraud where no fraud claims had been alleged or (ii) denying Ms. Wi^ivey 
leave to amend her pleadings to add fraud allegations after the close of discovery 
Standard of Review Mi, d:;<iii '" -turfs i1 .T1- ;, -, MI • 'v'lh"; ' ' i !'i ' 
evidence is reviewed for abuM. ol discretion. Eggett v. Wasatch Energy Corp., 2004 UT 
to permit a reply to an answer Utah R Civ. P. 7(a); Kleinert v. Kimball Elevator Co,5 
854 P.2d 1025, 10.28 ( Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
9256306 4 
Statement of the Case 
L Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings 
This case involves a very belated challenge to a 1994 court-ordered distribution of 
estate assets. To understand the various issues in the opening brief, it is important to 
become familiar with both the original probate action and the current lawsuit. In this 
section, the Hamilton brothers first provide a procedural overview of both lawsuits and 
then in the statement of facts provide a more detailed explanation of the operative orders. 
A. The 1994 Probate Action 
The parties to this action are siblings and the sole shareholders of Hamilton Bros. 
Electric, Inc. (the Company). (R. 1908.) Ms. McKelvey and the Hamilton brothers 
obtained their shares of the Company from the estate of their father, Gordon Dean 
Hamilton. (R. 1908.) In settling their father's estate in 1994, the district court judge, 
Judge Burningham, entered the 1994 FFCL and an order granting an interim distribution 
of assets to Ms. McKelvey, the Hamilton brothers, and their two sisters. (R. 1248-76.) 
The 1994 FFCL and order are attached to this brief at Addenda A and B. At times, the 
Hamilton brothers will refer collectively to the 1994 FFCL and the subsequent order as 
the "1994 FFCL." 
The 1994 FFCL describes the distribution of estate assets. (R. 1248-69.) The 
distribution of Company stock that forms the basis of Ms. McKelvey's claims on appeal 
stems from the 1994 FFCL. In 1994, Ms. McKelvey neither objected to nor appealed the 
1994 FFCL or order stemming from it. 
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B. The Pleadings in this Lawsuit 
against the Hamilton .brothers. The original complaint concerned themahagement oi 
< 'onipimv 'ill*1! Il'11"" I'^'l di"«Jnhii(iui iml .illegal llit' lolluWhiji, causes \A iii.lh 
(i) breach of contract; (ii) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; 
( . xLion of records, i < • ..J accounting; (v) conversion; (vi) breach of fiduciary 
duty; and (vii) negligence, i^v. i-L • in response tc a motion to dismiss Ms McKel \ e> 
filed an amended complaint that excluded the inspection of records and full accounting 
claims I 
The Hamilton brothers filed counterclaims tor (i i breach ol contract; (ii) breach of 
tilli! i. iiu 11»: .  -.-,a..:i:, •. co:x»u. . ..u * .hment; and 
(v) breach of iiuuciary duty. (IL 13w!/.) These counterclaims are important because 
tlleir dismissal was later consideration for the partial settlement agreement Ms, McKelvey 
disputes. 
On March 17, 2006, Ms, McKelvey filed a second amended complaint. (R, 561-
1/3 owner of the Company as oi J 9lu, despite the fact that Ms. McKelvey received, only 
1 hK\ of l l i i ; loll Il II! Ii 01 • i Our Ic t i i iM I O l l u : | 4 * M H " ! 'I . l i d . ) 
C. The Court Enters Partial Summary Judgment on Ms. Mt K i * * 
Challenge to the Original Distribution of Company Shares 
judgment asking the district court to determine as a matter of law that Ms. McKelvey and 
the Hamilton brothers received appropriate distribution0 °f Company shares under the 
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1994 FFCL. (R. 612-14.) Both Ms. McKelvey and the Hamilton brothers agreed that the 
relevant language in the 1994 FFCL was unambiguous. (R. 692; 1107; 1110; 1114; 
1287; 1923:37, 40, 58-59.) Ms. McKelvey asserted that under the plain language of the 
1994 FFCL the Hamilton brothers should have received the same number of shares as 
Ms. McKelvey (1,683 shares). The Hamilton brothers argued that they appropriately 
received more shares under the language in the 1994 FFCL that provided to them "all 
remaining assets of the estate," including any remaining shares of stock. (Id.) 
The district court granted partial summary judgment after it concluded that the 
1994 FFCL expressly authorized the distribution of 1,683 shares to McKelvey, and 
effectively authorized 4,158.5 shares to Vincent Hamilton, and 4,158.5 shares to Stuart 
Hamilton. (R. 1391; 1378-86.) The first issue in the opening brief challenges this ruling. 
D. The Court Enforces a Partial Settlement Agreement Between 
Ms. McKelvey and the Hamilton Brothers 
On July 17, 2007, the Hamilton brothers moved to enforce a partial settlement 
agreement between the Hamilton brothers and Ms. McKelvey. (R. 1556.) Prior to the 
district court's interpretation of the 1994 FFCL, the parties had agreed that they would 
(i) jointly hire and pay for a business valuation expert and (ii) limit the litigation to one 
issue—Ms. McKelvey's percentage ownership in the Company. (R. 1481; 1727; 1556.) 
After Ms. McKelvey's attorney who had negotiated the partial settlement agreement had 
withdrawn and Ms. McKelvey had hired new counsel, Ms. McKelvey denied that the 
parties had ever reached such an agreement. (R. 1581.) 
The district court enforced the settlement agreement based on the correspondence 
between the parties and the parties' subsequent actions. (R. 1735; 1912.) The court 
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o r d ^ ou that, 'as a result of the partial settlement, the onlj i emaining issue cone e i lie d 
ivis. ivlcKelvey's percentage interest in the Company. (R. 1911; 1 724 35.) A n d because 
M s . M c K e l v e y ' s interest previously had been determined by the order granting partial 
'luminary pjcliniiPtil nn r I a 11 f i s rntmifinl I V I VM I I lir s n mid issue raised in the 
opening brief challenges these rulings. 
E . I 
Prior to the cour t ' s order enforcing the sett lement agreement , on October 19, 2007, 
Ms . McKelvey had filed a "notion i.i .J :i-ine seeking to introduce evidence tna. . / e a r s 
car IHT tin1 1 Inimllori hi t*u * had eima»ed in fraud and sel l-dealing to procure the 1994 
FFCL. Ms. M c K e h e y also sought leave to amend her p leadings to include 
, I . M n . : u d a i j - » : ; • • . • j * - ' « • ! ' ? 
court denied the motions o*, numerous grounds, including (i) the issues that 
Ms . McKelvey was at tempting io raise Ii<ne al iuid) Im-ett icsuli, \ ml Ilii, lilii .ilium i I 
(ii) an amended pleading "'would be untimely and i mduly prejudicial.5 ' (R. 1905,) 1 1 le 
third and fourth issues in the opening b n a challenge this ruling. 
II. lit of Facts 
A. The Ownership I n t e r e s t s of the Hamilton Brothers and Ms . M c K e l v e y 
Die fii st issi le raised in tl le opening brief cc ncei i is tl »< * 1994 distribution u h e 
estate. In his will , the par t ies ' father stated that his estate shall he distributed equa lh 
among [he live chi ld iui , Nliiiiil Hamilton ..iinIII " ,'un nil Hamilton llln I liiiinlloii In mil) iisl, 
A m b e r McKelvey (Ms. McKelvey) , as well as Lisa Kunz and i'onuii Hamil ton (the tv\ o 
sisters). (R. 1268.) The will appoints the Hamil ton brothers as personal representatives 
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of the estate. (R. 1386.) In 1994, Judge Bumingham approved a distribution of the estate 
consistent with the will, which is reflected in the 1994 FFCL. (R. 1385; 1276; 1269.) 
1. The 1994 Distribution of Estate Assets 
In the 1994 FFCL, Judge Bumingham concluded that the net value of the estate 
was $891,6652 and that the 10,000 shares of Company stock were collectively worth 
$841,000 or $84.10 per share. (R. 1255; 1257; 1254.) As contemplated in the will, Judge 
Bumingham recognized "that there may be some difficulties with making the shares 
equal" because "the corporation would not involve all heirs and the house would 
probably not involve all heirs." (R. 1267-68.) Judge Bumingham recognized that 
"Amber McKelvey, Lisa H. Kunz and Tonua Hamilton have had very limited 
involvement with the actual running of the [Company], while Stuart G. Hamilton and 
Vincent C. Hamilton have been actively involved for a period of at least twenty or more 
years and have been a significant factor in preserving the [Company] as an asset for all 
heirs." (R. 1262.) In addition, to preserve the Company, the Hamilton brothers had been 
required to pledge all of their personal assets as "security to maintain the bonding" to 
prevent the Company from having "to turn over the projects and jobs to other contractors 
of the bonding company's choosing." (R. 1258.) 
Judge Bumingham then concluded that Ms. McKelvey and the two sisters would 
receive a distribution equal to $195,000.3 (R. 1254-55.) This $195,000 figure included a 
2
 Judge Bumingham determined that the gross value of the estate was $1,957,242 and the 
estate held $1,065,577 in expenses and reserves. (R. 1255.) 
3
 This is the amount that initially was proposed by the Hamilton brothers as personal 
representatives and adopted by the court despite the fact that "$178,333 [should have 
been the] actual amount determined by the values found by the Court." (R. 1255.) Thus, 
Ms. McKelvey and the two sisters each received more than 1/5 of the net estate. 
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previous distribution made to each heir in the amount of $53,492. (Id.) Therefore, 
Ms. McKelvey and each of the two sisters were to receive a prospective distribution 
equal to $141,508. (R. Id.) Because not all heirs would be involved in the Company, the 
Hamilton brothers offered a variety of distribution options to Ms. McKelvey and the two 
sisters. (R. 1255.) While the two sisters chose to receive their distributions in cash 
through installment payments, Ms. McKelvey chose to receive her distribution through 
Company stock. (R. 1252-54.) 
Each of these three distributions is set forth in the 1994 FFCL. The 1994 FFCL 
expressly distributes to Ms. McKelvey 1,683 shares of Company stock, which at the 
$84.10 share price made this distribution slightly more than the $141,508 owed to 
Ms. McKelvey. (R. 1254; 1276-77.) Ms. McKelvey concedes in the opening brief that 
she received this distribution specified in the 1994 FFCL. (AOB at 6; R. 1923:30.) 
The two sisters chose to receive their $141,508 in deferred cash payments instead 
of stock. (R. 1275.) Their cash distributions included a $37,500 payment to each sister, 
and the remaining $104,008 owed to each sister to be paid in installments of no less than 
$20,000 per year. (R. 1275; 1252-53.) The unpaid portion of the distribution accrued 
interest at a rate of 6% per year. (R. 1275; 1252-53.) The Hamilton brothers signed a 
personal guaranty for the total $208,016 obligation to the two sisters and were directed to 
raise part of the money by later selling certain real property in the estate valued by the 
court at $163,500. (R. 1275; 1255-57; 1253.) If no real estate were sold during a 
calendar year, then "$20,000 each is to be paid by the Personal Representative to each." 
(R. 1275.) On at least one occasion, the Hamilton brothers made $20,000 payments out 
of their own pockets. (R. 662.) 
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To secure the payment system, Ms. McKelvey and the two sisters deeded their 
interests in the estate's real property to the Hamilton brothers and then the two sisters 
recorded a lien against this property. (R. 1252.) Accordingly, the distributions to the two 
sisters became personal obligations of the Hamilton brothers in the event the estate was 
unable to make payments. 
The 1994 FFCL also required that "there is to be reserved the sum of $128,500 for 
attorney fees, appraisals and taxes to conclude the litigation and tax audits." (R. 1274.) 
If this money became insufficient for administration of the estate, the Hamilton brothers 
were personally responsible for paying any further expenses. (R. 1273.) Conversely, the 
1994 FFCL stated that any money left over from the $128,500 reserve was to be shared 
by all five heirs. (R. 1273; 125 L) In other words, the Hamilton brothers alone bore the 
risk of any shortfall, but all heirs would share in any net benefit to the estate.4 
Finally, the 1994 FFCL stated that all properties not otherwise reserved or 
distributed to Ms. McKelvey and her sisters shall be distributed to the Hamilton brothers: 
"all other assets of the Estate, except the reserves of $128,500 and the Mary Hamilton 
Property, is to be distributed to Stuart G. Hamilton and Vincent C. Hamilton, in kind, 
subject to the terms of the cash and deferred cash payment (sic) Lisa H. Kunz and Tonua 
Hamilton and the stock distributed to Amber McKelvey." (R. 1250-51 (emphasis 
added).) The subsequent order reiterates this ruling: "Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed 
that all remaining properties of the Estate, other than the reserves of $128,500 and the 
The Hamilton brothers were entitled to keep, however, a court-authorized personal 
representative fee of $134,540. (R. 1273-74.) 
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properties heretofore awarded to Mary Hamilton, be distributed to Stuart G. Hamilton 
and Vincent C. Hamilton equally." (R. 1273 (emphasis added).) 
Thus, the district court effectively ordered that all stock not distributed to 
Ms. McKelvey was to be distributed to the Hamilton brothers, which is precisely what 
occurred. The "in kind" distribution expressly awarded the Hamilton brothers all 
remaining property and saddled the Hamilton brothers with all remaining risk and 
liabilities. The district court in this case found that Ms. McKelvey's attorney of record 
approved the order as to form on January 20, 1994, a finding Ms. McKelvey does not 
challenge on appeal.6 (R. 1272, 1380-81.) 
2. The Logic of the 1994 Distribution of Assets 
While the 1994 FFCL provided the Hamilton brothers all remaining assets in the 
estate, it also saddled the Hamilton brothers with liabilities and obligations that made the 
net distribution to the Hamilton brothers less than the distributions to Ms. McKelvey and 
the two sisters. 
The burdens on the Hamilton brothers were numerous. First, the Hamilton 
brothers assumed all of the risks associated with maintaining the Company after their 
father's death and after the 1994 FFCL. Second, the Hamilton brothers pledged their 
5
 Mary Hamilton was Gordon Hamilton's wife, who received, among other things, a life 
estate on real property held by the estate. (R. 887-88.) 
6
 An objection to the proposed Order and 1994 FFCL was filed on January 14, 1994, by 
Ms. McKelvey's sister Lisa Kunz. One of the bases for this objection was that under the 
proposed Order and 1994 FFCL, Ms. McKelvey was not to receive "one third (1/3) of all 
issued and outstanding stock of the corporation." (R. 1175.) It further states that the 
Order and 1994 FFCL "do not reflect" that Ms. McKelvey is entitled to one third of the 
corporate stock. (R. 1175.) A copy of the Objection was mailed to Ms. McKelvey on 
January 14, 1994. (R. 1174.) After considering these objections, Judge Burningham 
entered the Order and the 1994 FFCL on January 21, 1994. (R. 1276; 1269.) No party 
ever appealed from this order. 
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personal assets for the indemnification of the bonding company after their father's death 
to allow the Company to continue operating. (R. 1261-62; 1258.) Third, the Hamilton 
brothers signed personal guaranties for the cash distributions to the two sisters. 
(R. 1273.) Fourth, the Hamilton brothers assumed all risks associated with the future sale 
of the real property in the estate. Fifth, the Hamilton brothers assumed all risks 
associated with any shortfall of expenses, taxes, or attorney fees. (R. 1254; 1252; 1273.) 
Sixth, the Hamilton brothers indemnified Ms. McKelvey and the two sisters from any and 
all claims made against the estate. (R. 1251; 1274.) In other words, while the Hamilton 
brothers were entitled to the "remaining" assets of the estate, they solely assumed all 
burdens and liabilities associated with the estate—burdens and liabilities not shared by 
Ms. McKelvey or her sisters. (R. 1272-75.) 
Consistent with the 1994 FFCL, Gordon Hamilton's shares in the Company were 
canceled, and 1683 shares were issued to Ms. McKelvey. (R. 648.) Also, because the 
estate had no cash to pay the Hamilton brothers their fee as personal representatives, the 
Hamilton brothers instead received 1600 shares of Company stock to satisfy their 
$134,540 fee. (R. 1273-74.) Then, pursuant to the 1994 FFCL, the remaining shares 
were divided equally between the Hamilton brothers. (R. 1273.) The end result was that 
each Hamilton brother received 4,158.5 shares. And again the value, if any, of that stock 
was wholly dependent on the Hamilton brothers' continuing to operate the business. 
Importantly, when the distributions were made, there were many unknowns, 
including (i) the amount the Hamilton brothers would have to contribute personally 
toward liabilities and to pay their two sisters, (ii) the viability of the Company, and 
(iii) the liabilities they would incur personally to indemnify Ms. McKelvey and the two 
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sisters. (R. 1272-76.) These risks were the Hamilton brothers'alone. Even so, 
Ms. McKelvey and the two sisters received a greater share of the estate in 1994. As 
stated above, the net worth of the estate was $891,665, and Ms. McKelvey and the two 
sisters each received $195,000, a total of $585,000. This means that the Hamilton 
brothers each received $153,332, which was nearly $40,000 less than Ms. McKelvey. 
The fact that the Hamilton brothers were able to discharge the liabilities and pay the two 
sisters, while keeping their shares in the Company, does not retroactively change the fact 
that the court-ordered distribution was equitable at the time it was made. 
C. The Parties Enter Into a Settlement Agreement Disposing of All Claims 
Other than Ms. McKelvey's Declaratory Judgment Claim 
In February 2006, after Ms. McKelvey had lost her bid to appoint a receiver for 
the Company, Ms. McKelvey's then counsel, Benson L. Hathaway, called the Hamilton 
brothers' counsel and proposed a partial settlement agreement. (R. 1734; 504; 1456.) 
Under the settlement agreement proposed by Mr. Hathaway, the parties "jointly agree on 
a business valuation expert who could render an opinion on the value of the Company, 
the cost of which would be shared by our clients [and] to limit the issues now before the 
court solely to the issue of what Ms. McKelvey's percentage ownership is." (R. 1734; 
1456.) The Hamilton brothers' counsel memorialized these terms in a letter dated 
February 24, 2006, and stated that "my clients agree to this proposal."7 (R. 1734; 1456.) 
Mr. Hathaway does not dispute these facts. (R. 1559-62.) 
n 
On March 21, 2006, the Hamilton brothers' counsel sent another letter to Mr. Hathaway 
mentioning, for the first time, that the appraisal would be binding on the parties. 
(R. 1733.) Importantly, this was after the parties had agreed on the other two issues. 
(R. 1725.) 
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The subsequent actions of Ms. McKelvey and her counsel confirm that this 
agreement was reached. Within one week of the Hamilton brothers' acceptance, 
Mr. Hathaway proposed the names of two business valuation experts who could appraise 
the value of the Company, experts the parties then interviewed. (R. 1732.) 
Ms. McKelvey amended her complaint to include a claim for declaratory relief relating to 
her percentage ownership in the Company. (R. 1731.) Ms. McKelvey also agreed that 
the Hamilton brothers did not need to answer this second amended complaint because the 
o 
settlement agreement would dispose of many of her claims. (R. 1447; 1727.) 
Even though an oral agreement (memorialized in writing) was reached, a written 
settlement agreement was never signed. (R. 1445.) Subsequently, Ms. McKelvey 
retained new counsel and the district court granted summary judgment declaring that 
Ms. McKelvey was entitled to no more than 1683 shares of Company stock. (R. 1391; 
1432.) Based on the settlement agreement, this should have ended the litigation. It did 
not. (R. 1555.) After Ms. McKelvey's new counsel would not agree to dismiss the 
remaining claims, the Hamilton brothers were forced to move the district court to enforce 
the partial settlement agreement. (R. 1481.) After full briefing and argument, the district 
court found an enforceable settlement agreement wherein the parties agreed (i) to 
commission a business valuation expert and (ii) to limit the operative claims in this 
lawsuit to Ms. McKelvey's claim for a declaration that her percentage ownership in the 
Company is greater than that reflected in the 1994 FFCL. (R. 1727.) 
o 
Eventually, after many months and after new counsel became involved, the Hamilton 
brothers took the cautionary step of answering the second amended complaint, asserting 
that the claims were barred by an accord and satisfaction reached with Ms. McKelvey's 
prior counsel. (R. 1421; 1414.) Based on the partial settlement agreement, this answer 
included no counterclaims. (Id.) 
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D. Ms. McKelvey Seeks to Revive Her Case 
After having settled all claims except her declaratory judgment claim, and after the 
district court had declared the percentage ownership of the Company was not the 1/3 
percentage Ms. McKelvey wanted, Ms. McKelvey sought to introduce new claims for 
fraud and self-dealing. (R. 1713.) The timeline of these claims is important to 
understanding why the district court denied Ms. McKelvey's belated request. (R. 1909.) 
Ms. McKelvey's original complaint filed on September 29, 2004, did not include 
any claims for fraud, self-dealing, or violation of Company bylaws. (R. 1-15.) 
Ms. McKelvey's first amended complaint filed on August 10, 2005, also did not include 
claims for fraud, self-dealing, or violation of Company bylaws. (R. 75-88.) 
In August 2005, the Hamilton brothers filed their answer to the first amended 
complaint and counterclaims, which states that the basis for the distribution of shares 
from the Company was the 1994 FFCL, which was attached to the Hamilton brothers' 
answer. (R. 131-79; 1908.) Thus, as of August 2005, Ms. McKelvey knew that the 
Hamilton brothers were relying upon the 1994 FFCL as justification for the then-current 
stock distribution. (R. 1905.) On October 21, 2005, Ms. McKelvey answered the 
Hamilton brothers' counterclaims with no suggestion (i) of fraud or (ii) that the Hamilton 
brothers had failed to distribute Company stock in accordance with Company bylaws. 
(R. 341-46.) 
In the Hamilton brothers' November 2005 interrogatory responses, they again 
asserted that their equity interest in the Company was based upon the 1994 FFCL. (R. 
1778-79; 1765-66; 1907.) Ms. McKelvey then filed her second amended complaint on 
March 17, 2006, again with no mention of fraud or self-dealing. (R. 561-75.) 
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Based on this course of events, the district court concluded that Ms. McKelvey 
was on notice "no later than August 2005 or November 2005" that the Hamilton brothers 
would rely upon the 1994 FFCL. (R. 1905.) Yet it was not until December 2006 in 
papers opposing the Hamilton brothers5 motion for summary judgment that 
Ms. McKelvey first alleged the Hamilton brothers had committed some sort of fraud prior 
to the 1994 FFCL and had improperly transferred stock from the estate to themselves. 
(R. 1098-1160; 1906.) While the Hamilton brothers agreed that Ms. McKelvey did not 
need to file a pleading to raise fraud as a defense to the Hamilton brothers' affirmative 
defenses, the Hamilton brothers never agreed that, after the grant of summary judgment, 
Ms. McKelvey could affirmatively reassert these new grounds to attack collaterally the 
validity of the 1994 FFCL. (R. 1717; 1842; 1846.) 
The district court agreed that Ms. McKelvey could not assert these new grounds so 
many years after the claimed conduct, and at such a late stage in the present litigation. 
(R. 1903-09.) Instead, the district court correctly concluded that allowing Ms. McKelvey 
to present evidence of an alleged fraud perpetrated on the previous court that entered the 
1994 FFCL "would result in allowing [Ms. McKelvey] to amend her pleadings to bring a 
new affirmative cause of action to set aside the Order and [FFCL]." (R. 1906.) 
Additionally, at a December 6, 2007 hearing before the district court, Ms. McKelvey 
"conceded" that the district court's prior rulings "disposed of her contention that [the 
Hamilton brothers'] receipt of [Company] stock was voided by the [Company's] bylaws." 
(R. 1906.) Finally, the district court correctly concluded that any additional amendments 
would be "untimely and unduly prejudicial." (R. 1905.) 
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Summary of the Argument 
Ms. McKelvey first asserts that the 1994 FFCL did not authorize the Hamilton 
brothers to receive 8,317 shares of Company stock. Yet the plain language of the 1994 
FFCL provides that the Hamilton brothers are to receive "all remaining properties in the 
Estate" and that they will receive their distribution "in kind." (R. 1273; 1251; 1249.) 
The Hamilton brothers did receive all remaining shares of Company stock, which 
explains their ownership interest in the Company. 
Aside from complying with the plain language of the 1994 FFCL, the distribution 
also was equitable. In addition to receiving all remaining Company stock, the Hamilton 
brothers also "received" (i) personal liability for all debts of the estate, (ii) personal 
liability for indemnifying all other heirs, (iii) personal responsibility for ensuring the 
Company could continue to conduct business, and (iv) personal liability for making cash 
distributions to the two sisters. The 1994 FFCL recognized the net assets of the estate 
total $891,665, of which $585,000 was distributed to heirs other than the Hamilton 
brothers, leaving them each with net assets worth $153,333. The distribution of 8,317 
shares to the Hamilton brothers was therefore both plainly authorized under the 1994 
FFCL and entirely equitable. 
Ms. McKelvey next claims that the district court erred in enforcing a partial 
settlement agreement. This claim also fails. Ms. McKelvey's counsel offered a proposed 
partial settlement to the Hamilton brothers' counsel, which was accepted. The terms of 
the agreement were that (i) the parties would jointly share the costs of a business 
valuation expert and (ii) the litigation would be limited to one claim: a determination of 
Ms. McKelvey's percentage ownership in the Company. The parties then performed 
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under the terms of this agreement by both hiring and jointly paying for a valuation expert 
and prosecuting and defending only the single claim concerning Ms. McKelvey's 
percentage ownership. The Hamilton brothers surrendered all of their counterclaims. 
The fact that Ms. McKelvey's subsequent counsel wanted to escape from the agreement 
after the district court had ruled that Ms. McKelvey is entitled only to the percentage 
ownership she currently possesses does not change that fact that an agreement had been 
reached. 
Finally, Ms. McKelvey asserts that the district court abused its discretion in 
denying her leave to introduce fraud claims after all her other claims had failed. 
Ms. McKelvey sought to introduce these new fraud claims as a defense to the 
enforceability of the asset distribution described in the 1994 FFCL. Yet Ms. McKelvey 
had known for a very long time that the Hamilton brothers would rely upon the terms of 
the 1994 FFCL prior to her raising the issue in motion papers. Only after the district 
court rejected Ms. McKelvey's interpretation of the 1994 FFCL did she seek to amend 
her pleadings to include a claim that the 1994 FFCL—to which Ms. McKelvey neither 
objected nor appealed in 1994—was the result of some sort of fraud and self-dealing on 
the part of the Hamilton brothers. In any event, the fraud allegations make no sense 
because the Hamilton brothers received less of the net estate, not more. The trial court 
acted appropriately and within its discretion in denying Ms. McKelvey's leave to amend 
her pleadings to add fraud claims. 
The court should affirm on all counts. 
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Argument 
I. The 1994 FFCL Authorized Ms. McKelvey to Receive 1,683 Company Shares 
and the Hamilton Brothers to Receive any Remaining Shares 
The first issue concerns the distribution of Company stock to the Hamilton 
brothers under the terms of the 1994 FFCL. In the district court, all parties agreed that 
this issue could be determined as a matter of law because the language of the 1994 FFCL 
was unambiguous. Thus, the district court was asked to determine whether the plain 
language of the 1994 FFCL authorized the distribution of 1683 shares of Company stock 
to Ms. McKelvey and 4,158.5 shares of Company stock to each of the Hamilton brothers. 
The reason the posture of the issue presented to the district court is important is 
that Ms. McKelvey has raised in the opening brief a host of new arguments that are not 
properly before this court. First, Ms. McKelvey argues on appeal that the 1994 FFCL is 
ambiguous, something she expressly denied in the district court. Second, Ms. McKelvey 
suggests fraud and self-dealing as a way to attack the 1994 FFCL, even though in the 
district court Ms. McKelvey raised fraud and self-dealing only in response to defenses 
involving res judicata and a statute of limitations, defenses that the district court rejected 
and that have not been appealed. 
As demonstrated below, the only issue before the court concerning the 1994 FFCL 
is whether the plain language of the 1994 FFCL authorized the distribution of 4,158.5 
shares to each Hamilton brother. It is difficult to understand how language that expressly 
distributes all residual property in the estate to the Hamilton brothers could have operated 
to do anything other than distribute 4,158.5 shares to each of the Hamilton brothers, since 
that was the stock left over after all other distributions. 
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A. Before the District Court, All Parties Agreed that the 1994 FFCL and 
Subsequent Order Are Unambiguous 
The 1994 FFCL is unambiguous, which is precisely what Ms. McKelvey argued 
before the district court. Specifically, Ms. McKelvey argued that under the plain 
language of the 1994 FFCL, the Hamilton brothers should not have received the 
remaining 8,317 shares of Company stock.9 At oral argument, her counsel stated that 
"[Ms. McKelvey] is completely satisfied with the findings of fact and conclusions of 
law." (R. 1923:37.) He repeatedly stressed that Ms. McKelvey was not challenging the 
1994 FFCL and that the district court should interpret the 1994 FFCL as a matter of law. 
(R. 1923:37, 40, 58-59.) Most telling, when asked by the district court why 
Ms. McKelvey had cited the decision in Culbertson,10 a case that concerns an ambiguous 
court order, Ms. McKelvey's counsel responded that it was the Hamilton brothers who 
argued ambiguity, not Ms. McKelvey. (R. 1923:47.) The Hamilton brothers, however, 
have consistently argued only that the 1994 FFCL and subsequent order unambiguously 
authorized distribution of the remaining shares of Company stock to the Hamilton 
brothers. (R. 692; 1287.) 
Inconsistent with her prior position, on appeal Ms. McKelvey argues that the 1994 
FFCL is ambiguous and must be construed against the Hamilton brothers. (AOB at 30, 
31-36.) This argument is not preserved.11 Gardner v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 2008 UT 
6, [^19 n.4, 178 P.3d 893 (recognizing that an argument "not raised below" is "not 
9
 McKelvey argued that the Hamilton brothers' distribution both was not authorized by 
the 1994 FFCL and was in violation of the 1994 FFCL. (R. 1114; 1107; 1110.) She did 
not argue that the 1994 FFCL was ambiguous. 
10
 Culbertson v. Board of County Commissioners, 2001 UT 108, 44 P.3d 642. 
11
 Ms. McKelvey has consistently claimed throughout this litigation that she was entitled 
to 1/3 of the Company under the plain language of the 1994 FFCL. (R. 1922:70-71.) 
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preserved and cannot properly come before us on appeal"). Worse, to the extent 
Ms. McKelvey is correct that the 1994 FFCL is ambiguous—which it is not—the district 
court's error was invited by Ms. McKelvey. Under the invited error doctrine, "a party 
cannot take advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court 
into committing the error." Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, f 17, 164 P.3d 366. The 
Supreme Court has identified three factors to consider in determining whether an error 
was invited: (i) whether the issue was timely raised; (ii) whether the issue was 
specifically raised; and (iii) whether the party introduced supporting evidence or relevant 
legal authority. Id. at^|15. Here, Ms. McKelvey specifically represented to the district 
court that the 1994 FFCL was unambiguous and never argued that the language was 
ambiguous. Ms. McKelvey therefore neither expressly raised this issue nor introduced 
evidence or case law to support the claim she now raises for the first time on appeal 
This court should therefore interpret the 1994 FFCL as the district court did, as a matter 
of law. (R. 1391-93; 1378-86.) The plain language of the 1994 FFCL confirms that the 
district court was correct. 
B. The Plain Language of the 1994 FFCL and Order Confirms that the 
Distribution of Stock to the Hamilton Brothers Was Authorized 
Reviewing the "'plain language' of [an order] . . . is invariably the first order of 
business in construing legally significant writings." Magnesium Corp. of Am. v. Air 
Quality Bd., 941 P.2d 653, 659 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citing to cases interpreting statutes, 
administrative rules, deeds, letters of intent, and lease agreements). When interpreting an 
order, it should be "construe[d] . . . in its entirety and to reconcile and harmonize all of its 
provisions, as is also required." Id The only time a court should look beyond the plain 
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language of an order is "when it may reasonably cbe understood to have two or more 
plausible meanings.5" Utah Pub. Employees Ass'n. v. Utah, 2006 UT 9,160, 131 P.3d 
208. The plain language of the 1994 FFCL, and in particular the language concerning the 
number of shares Ms. McKelvey and the Hamilton brothers were to receive, cannot be 
understood to have two or more plausible meanings. 
At the time the 1994 FFCL was entered, the gross estate was valued at $1,957,242, 
and the total expenses and reserves of the estate totaled $1,065,577, leaving a net value of 
$891,665. (R. 1255.) As a result, the district court determined that each heir was entitled 
to a distribution of $178,333. The district court nonetheless elected to issue to 
Ms. McKelvey and the two sisters a distribution equal to $195,000 because this larger 
amount had been previously proposed by the Hamilton brothers. (R. 1254-55.) 
Also at the time of the 1994 FFCL, the shares of the Company comprised less than 
half of the value of the gross estate. There were 10,000 shares valued at $84.10 each, 
which totaled $841,000. (R. 1256.) Thus, the 1683 shares distributed to Ms. McKelvey 
were worth approximately $141,508, which combined with a previous distribution to 
Ms. McKelvey of $53,492, brings the value of the total distribution to Ms. McKelvey to 
$195,000. (R. 1254-55.) It is undisputed that this is precisely what Ms. McKelvey 
received. In other words, there is no question that Ms. McKelvey received all of the 
stock to which she was entitled under the plain language of the 1994 FFCL. 
Similarly, the distribution to the two sisters totaled $195,000 each. Because the 
two sisters also had previously received $53,500 in estate property, under the terms of the 
Further, McKelvey's cites Culbertson v. Board of County Commissioners is irrelevant. 
2001 UT 108,1115, 44 P,3d 642. (AOB at 30.) Where all parties agree there are no 
ambiguities, the court need not construe ambiguities against either party. 
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1994 FFCL they were still owed $141,508 each. (R. 1253.) The two sisters elected to be 
paid in cash, but the estate did not have sufficient cash to pay them immediately. So they 
agreed to be paid in the future while the unpaid balance accrued interest at a rate of 6%. 
(R. 1253.) It is undisputed that the two sisters were eventually paid according to the 
terms set forth in the 1994 FFCL.13 
The only remaining issue, with regard to the plain language of the 1994 FFCL, is 
whether the Hamilton brothers received their distribution in accordance with the 1994 
FFCL.14 They did. The 1994 FFCL states that the Hamilton brothers would receive "all 
remaining properties of the Estate," or elsewhere, "all other assets of the Estate," or 
elsewhere, "[a]ll other property of the Estate." (R. 1273; 1251; 1249.) The Hamilton 
brothers did receive all other assets, and liabilities, in the estate. Therefore, in the end, 
there also is no dispute concerning whether the Hamilton brothers' distribution was in 
accordance with the 1994 FFCL. 
C. The Hamilton Brothers Did Not Receive a Windfall 
Perhaps recognizing that the plain language of the 1994 FFCL provides for exactly 
the distribution the Hamilton Brothers received, Ms. McKelvey's focus shifts to whether 
McKelvey also faults the Hamilton brothers for their belief that the cash distributions 
to the two sisters were a "buy-out" of the sisters' shares. (AOB at 7.) This is a red 
herring. The heirs' personal views concerning the legal implications of what occurred are 
irrelevant. Regardless, Ms. McKelvey herself believed the same thing. (R. 1922:58 
("That when my sisters were bought out, it all went one-third/one-third.").) 
14
 At times, McKelvey argues that the Hamilton brothers are entitled to less than 1,683 
shares. (R. 1923: 46, 49.) On this point, the district court questioned how Judge 
Burningham could have intended Ms. McKelvey to become the majority shareholder in a 
company in which she "never participated, and really its value is tied up in those who 
worked for it." (R. 1923:49.) Based on the plain language of the will and the 1994 
FFCL, the Hamilton brothers, as the only heirs involved with the Company, were plainly 
intended to be in charge of the Company after their father's death. (R. 1258; 1260; 1262; 
1263; 1267.) 
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the Hamilton brothers received a windfall by receiving the remaining assets of the estate 
in accordance with the 1994 FFCL. (AOB at 1.) Apart from having nothing to do with 
the plain language of the 1994 FFCL, this complaint is simply incorrect and gains 
traction only by ignoring entirely the liabilities the Hamilton brothers incurred. 
The gross assets of the estate totaled $1,957,242. Apart from the $195,000 paid to 
Ms. McKelvey and each of the two sisters, the Hamilton brothers together received the 
balance of the estate, which had a gross value of $1,372,242. This was a windfall, argues 
Ms. McKelvey, since the Hamilton brothers were each entitled to the same 1/5 
distribution of the estate. Of course, what this ignores is the known liabilities of the 
estate, which totaled $1,065, 577.15 Therefore, the net distribution to the Hamilton 
brothers was $306,665 for both of them; hardly a windfall, and, in fact, less than the 
distribution to the other heirs.16 
In addition, the Hamilton brothers assumed great risk that no other heir assumed. 
First, the court set aside a $128,500 reserve for attorney fees, appraisals, and taxes to 
satisfy liabilities associated with pending litigation and tax audits. The 1994 FFCL 
expressly provided that if this reserve amount is inadequate, then the Hamilton brothers 
The liabilities included (i) $12,779 in funeral expenses; (ii) $94,805 in debt expenses; 
(iii) $17,329 in mortgage expenses; (iv) $290,804 to Mary Hamilton (the wife); 
(v) $216,358 in administrative and attorney fees; (vi) $301,600 in taxes; (vii) $3,202 for 
miscellaneous expenses; and (viii) $128,500 in reserves for a tax audit, attorney fees to 
defend a lawsuit, and appraisal fees. (R. 1256.) These liabilities total $1,065,577. 
16
 McKelvey also claims that the Hamilton brothers received a parcel of real property that 
remained in the estate. This is immaterial. The Hamilton brothers have fully paid the 
two sisters their cash distributions from the estate, and if any real property remained in 
the estate after these obligations were satisfied, such property was to pass to the Hamilton 
brothers as additional "remaining property] of the Estate." (R. 1273.) 
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alone must make up the difference. (R. 1251-52; 1254.) Second, the Hamilton brothers 
had to indemnify and hold harmless the other three heirs for any adjustments to asset 
values as a result of then-pending litigation with the estate. (R. 1251.) Third, the 
Hamilton brothers were required to pledge all of their personal assets as security to 
continue the business of the Company so that the bonding company would not transfer 
their work to competitors. (R. 1261-62; 1258.) 
In the end, the Hamilton brothers' receipt of more stock than Ms. McKelvey was 
authorized, equitable, and reflected the distribution contemplated in Judge Burningham's 
orders. Further, this distribution is consistent with their father's intent that his sons, who 
were actively involved in the Company for twenty years, would continue to participate in 
the Company while the sisters could choose cash instead. The Company likely would 
have floundered without the Hamilton brothers' involvement, which was indispensible to 
maximizing the value of Company shares, including Ms. McKelvey's shares. 
The district court did not err in concluding that the Hamilton brothers received 
what they were entitled to receive under the 1994 FFCL. This court should affirm. 
II. The Parties Entered into a Partial Settlement Agreement Which Disposed of 
All Claims and Counterclaims with the Exception of the Declaration of Ms. 
McKelvey's Percentage Ownership in the Company 
The district court also did not abuse its discretion in enforcing the settlement 
agreement. "Settlement agreements may be summarily enforced without an evidentiary 
hearing." Goodmansen v. Liberty Vending Sys„ Inc., 866 P.2d 58L 584 n.2 (Utah Ct. 
The pro rata distribution of any remaining reserves could have been similarly applied 
by Judge Burningham to other remaining assets. The fact that the court did not do so 
compels the conclusion that it did not intend the remaining stock to be divided among the 
siblings, but instead, that the Hamilton brothers alone were entitled to it. 
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App. 1993). "In determining whether the parties created an enforceable contact, a court 
should consider all preliminary negotiations, offers, and counteroffers and interpret the 
various expressions of the parties for the purpose of deciding whether the parties reached 
agreement on complete and definite terms." Nunlev v. Westates Casing Servs., Inc., 
1999 UT 100, Tf22, 989 P.2d 1077. Under this law and the facts of this case, this court 
should affirm. 
The district court did not abuse its discretion in enforcing the settlement agreement 
based on the correspondence and conduct of the parties. Contrary to Ms. McKelvey's 
i R 
assertions, there was ample evidence that the parties had agreed to the material terms of 
the enforceable partial settlement agreement. The lack of a written agreement is of no 
consequence. And contrary to Ms. McKelvey's suggestion in the opening brief, all 
evidence supporting the existence of an agreement was admissible. 
A. The District Court Correctly Concluded that an Enforceable 
Agreement Was Reached 
Ms. McKelvey's attorney, Mr. Hathaway, made the following offer to the 
Hamilton brothers: (i) the parties hire and share the expense of a business valuation 
expert and (ii) the parties limit the issues before the district court to Ms. McKelvey's 
percentage of ownership in the Company. (R. 1734.) The Hamilton brothers accepted 
this offer. And Mr. Hathaway does not dispute these facts.19 (R. 1559-62.) Moreover, 
i R Ms. McKelvey asserts that the Hamilton brothers submitted no evidence of her 
agreement to the district court, but the evidence in the record demonstrates that 
Mr. Hathaway, her attorney and agent, did agree and that the parties acted in ways 
demonstrating that they had reached an agreement. (AOB at 36.) 
19
 As recognized by the district court, in Mr. Hathaway's affidavit, he conceded that the 
parties agreed to "a general concept of terms for an approach toward resolving the 
pending litigation" even though the draft settlement agreement was "unacceptable" to 
Mr. Hathaway in its "current form" as drafted by the Hamilton brothers' counsel. 
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even assuming Mr. Hathaway did not make this offer, when he received correspondence 
from the Hamilton brothers accepting his offer, one would have expected Mr. Hathaway 
to respond by denying that there was an offer to accept. Tellingly, there was no such 
response. 
The district court, after thoughtfully analyzing the appropriate case law and tfte 
correspondence between the parties, concluded that the terms of this agreement were 
unambiguous and that there was a meeting of the minds as to these unambiguous, 
definite, material terms. (R. 1725-30.) Brown's Shoe Fit Co. v. Olch, 955 P.2d 357, 364 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998) ("The crucial question is whether the parties agreed on the essential 
terms of the contract.'5). 
"[T]he conduct of the parties indicates that both parties believed a settlement 
agreement had been reached." Goodmansen, 866 P.2d at 585. After the agreement was 
reached, Mr. Hathaway proposed two possible business valuation experts. Mr. Hathaway 
and the Hamilton brothers' counsel set up appointments to interview and choose the 
expert. The meetings were canceled and Mr. Hathaway withdrew as counsel for 
Ms. McKelvey. Her new counsel and the Hamilton brothers' counsel subsequently 
(R. 1726-27.) Accordingly, the district court concluded that there was "no conflicting 
evidence as to the existence of a partial settlement agreement." (R. 1727.) 
McKelvey asserts that she would not have entered into the agreement without the 
buyout provision. Her own actions belie this assertion. Even as Ms. McKelvey denied 
the existence of the partial settlement agreement, the parties did share the costs of the 
business valuation expert without any agreement that a buyout would follow. And of 
course, she made no complaint when the Hamilton brothers dropped their counterclaims 
against her. Regardless, the district court correctly concluded that the agreement 
evidenced by the February 24 correspondence was silent as to any buyout. (R. 1726; 
1537.) The issue was later raised by the Hamilton brothers' attorney (not Ms. 
McKelvey's), but not included in later drafts memorializing the settlement agreement. 
(R. 1725.) Therefore, a buyout was not essential to the parties' agreement. 
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retained a business valuation expert who conducted the evaluation. (R. 1553.) 
Ms. McKelvey also filed her second amended complaint to include her declaratory 
91 
judgment claim—the issue about which the parties agreed to limit the lawsuit. Finally, 
after the parties had entered into the agreement, the Hamilton brothers dismissed their 
counterclaims and paid their part for a business valuation. (R. 1725.) 
With the evidence of Ms. McKelvey's offer, the Hamilton brothers' acceptance, 
and the parties' subsequent actions in accordance with the agreement, the Hamilton 
brothers satisfied their burden of demonstrating that an agreement had been reached. The 
fact that there were some outstanding issues is irrelevant to the parties' agreement (i) to 
retain a business valuation expert and (ii) to limit all of the parties' claims to 
Ms. McKelvey's percentage ownership. The district court's ruling should be affirmed. 
B. The Absence of a Writing Does Not Negate an Otherwise Enforceable 
Agreement 
Once the parties reached their partial settlement agreement, Ms. McKelvey was 
legally bound by its terms. "It is of no legal consequence that the parties have not signed 
a settlement agreement." Goodmansen, 866 P.2d at 584. "Parties have no right to welch 
on a settlement deal during the sometimes substantial period between when the deal is 
99 
struck and when all necessary signatures can be garnered on a stipulation." Id. at 585. 
" Ms. McKelvey points to this as continued litigation supporting her claim that no 
agreement existed; in fact, the opposite is true because the amendment conformed the 
case to reflect the parties' agreement. 
* As the parties' actions confirm, this was not a case where the parties never intended to 
enter an agreement until it had been reduced to writing. Goodmansen, 866 P.2d at 585 
(recognizing that "if a written agreement is intended to memorialize an oral contract, a 
subsequent failure to execute the written document does not nullify the oral contract"); U 
800 Contacts, Inc. v. Wetener, 2005 UT App 523, 1^6, 127 P.3d 1241 (finding a writing 
necessary where the correspondence included the statement "This offer . . . is not to be 
considered legally binding until a physically executed contract between the two 
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The circumstances in Goodmansen were similar to those here, where "letters 
between [counsel] constitute^] a binding settlement agreement between the parties." Id.; 
see also John Deere Co. v. A&H Equip., Inc., 876 P.2d 880 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)23 
(recognizing a meeting of the minds to enter a settlement agreement even though one 
party changed its mind after the agreement was reduced to writing and demanded 
additional terms). Additionally, like the actions of Ms. McKelvey, the subsequent 
conduct of the parties in Goodmansen corroborated the existence of the agreement. 
Goodmansen, 866 P.2d at 585. In accordance with Goodmansen, the district court here 
correctly concluded that the lack of a signed writing was of no consequence. "The parties 
did not defer their legal obligations until the contemplated writing was prepared and 
executed." (R. 1726.) 
C. The Evidence Supporting the Existence of an Agreement Is Admissible 
Contrary to Ms. McKelvey's assertions in the opening brief, the evidence relied 
upon by the district court was admissible. Similar evidence has been considered in other 
cases. John Deere Co., 876 P.2d at 884-85 ("there are three relevant documents in the 
record that changed hands between the parties—two letters and the unsigned settlement 
agreement"). Further, Ms. McKelvey's claim that the correspondence is hearsay is not 
supported by law. "Statements that constitute verbal acts (e.g., words of contract or 
slander) are not hearsay because they are not offered for their truth.. . . Similarly, a 
statement offered to show its effect on the person who heard the statement is not 
companies is completed. Until the time said contract is executed I may, at my sole 
discretion, rescind or modify this offer in any way I see fit."); Engineering Assocs. Inc. v. 
Irving Place Assocs., 622 P.2d 784 (Utah 1980). 
The district court recognized that the factual situation in the instant case is "strikingly 
similar" to the circumstances present in Goodmansen and John Deere. (R. 1726.) 
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hearsay." Schindler v. Seiler, 474 F.3d 1008, 1010-11 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing the Fed. R. 
Evid. 801(c) advisory committee notes, which state that "the Rule 801(c) excludes from 
the definition of hearsay verbal acts and verbal parts of an act in which the statement 
itself affects the legal rights of the parties or is a circumstance bearing on conduct 
affecting their rights") Here, the Hamilton brothers have offered the correspondence to 
show the contract into which the parties entered. By definition, it is not hearsay. 
This admissible evidence establishes that the parties entered into a partial 
settlement agreement with two material terms: (i) joint payment of a business valuation 
expert and (ii) limiting claims before the district court to Ms. McKelvey 5s percentage 
ownership in the Company. The district court appropriately enforced this partial 
settlement agreement. 
III. The District Court Acted Within Its Discretion in Denying (i) a Motion in 
Limine to Introduce Evidence Unrelated to Active Claims and (ii) a Motion 
For Leave to Amend Her Pleadings 
There are two motions at issue in this section. With one motion, Ms. McKelvey 
sought to introduce evidence that the 1994 FFCL was a result of fraud. With the other 
motion, Ms. McKelvey sought leave to amend her pleadings to include these fraud 
allegations. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying either motion. 
A. The Court Need Not Review the Denial of the Motion in Limine 
With the motion in limine, Ms. McKelvey sought to introduce at trial evidence 
that the 1994 FFCL was a result of fraud. (AOB at 41.) Unless this court reverses the 
dismissal of one of Ms. McKelvey's affirmative claims, this motion is irrelevant. If there 
are no claims to try, there is no need to determine what evidence will be heard at trial. 
More important, the fraud claims are implausible on their face because the Hamilton 
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bothers received less, not more, of their 1/5 share of the estate. Thus, assuming there was 
fraud—which there was not—the fraud could not have harmed anyone other than the 
Hamilton brothers themselves. The belated fraud allegations are a red herring. 
If the court does decide to review the denial of the motion in limine, the court 
should affirm for all the same reasons it should affirm the denial of Ms. McKelvey's 
motion to amend her pleadings. 
B- The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying the Motion 
For Leave to File Amended Pleadings 
Once it was apparent that there were no claims for which Ms. McKelvey could 
introduce evidence of fraud, Ms. McKelvey sought leave to file an amended pleading to 
include such allegations. These new allegations included nearly 20 pages of new issues 
far afield from what had previously been asserted in her first three complaints. (R. 1674-
94.) The district court recognized the new claims aattempt[] to raise . . . affirmative 
claims that have already been resolved in this litigation." (R. 1905.) Ms. McKelvey 
denies this by claiming that her new fraud allegations are merely responses to the 
Hamilton brothers' affirmative defenses. (AOB at 41.) If this is correct, then the court 
need not review this issue either. Ms. McKelvey presented her fraud defense in 
opposition to the Hamilton brothers' motion for summary judgment on Ms. McKelvey's 
request for declaration that she owned 1/3 of the Company. (R. 1098-1115.) The district 
court nonetheless granted the motion for summary judgment. Thus, again, these fraud 
allegations are not responsive to any operative claims in this lawsuit.24 
24
 Also, simply because the Hamilton brothers did not object to the argument in an 
opposition to motion for summary judgment does not lead to the conclusion that 
wholesale introduction of new claims at trial should be permitted. In Lloyd's Unlimited 
v. Nature's Way Mktg., Ltd., 753 P.2d 507, 511 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), the court 
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Regardless, the district court did not err in denying the motion for leave to file 
amended pleadings. A district court must consider three factors "when deciding whether 
to grant a motion to amend: (1) the timeliness of the motion; (2) the justification given 
by the movant for the delay; and (3) the resulting prejudice to the responding party." 
Kleinert v. Kimball Elevator Co., 854 P.2d 1025,1028 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Here, all 
three factors weigh against Ms. McKelvey. 
1. The Motion for Leave to File Amended Pleadings Was Untimely 
Eleven years after the fact, in August 2005 the Hamilton brothers confirmed the 
obvious, that the 1994 FFCL was the governing document giving rise to their equity 
interests in the Company. (R. 1907-08.) Yet Ms. McKelvey failed to claim fraud or 
self-dealing in 1994, and again over the two years following this confirmation. And she 
did so only after (i) the close of discovery; (ii) the disposition of dispositive motions, and 
(iii) the parties' settlement of all claims except her request for a declaration concerning 
her percentage ownership in the Company. In this context, the district court correctly 
concluded that the party should have been granted leave to amend its complaint after the 
issues were presented at trial. Here, Ms. McKelvey sought permission to introduce the 
evidence at trial and the district court exercised its discretion and denied Ms. McKelvey 
the opportunity to present evidence of these new claims at trial and also denied her ability 
to amend her pleadings by filing a reply. 
Ironically, Ms. McKelvey claims that she should have been permitted to amend her 
pleadings and introduce evidence of fraud and self-dealing at trial because the Hamilton 
brothers had been on notice of these claims for months because she asserted them in the 
summary judgment opposition. (AOB at 46.) It is Ms. McKelvey who was on notice that 
the Hamilton brothers' claims of stock ownership were a result of the 1994 FFCL for no 
less than two years before she sought leave to rebut their claims with the allegations of 
fraud and self-dealing. Ms. McKelvey missed her opportunities to assert these claims in 
1994, and again between 2005 and 2007. 
25
 Ms. McKelvey argues that the Hamilton brothers did not rely upon the 1994 FFCL 
until November 2006 or February 2007. This allegation was rejected by the district court 
and is not supported by the history of the case. (R. 1905.) 
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concluded that Ms. McKelvey's request was "untimely and unduly prejudicial." (R. 
1905.) 
2. Ms. McKelvey Provided No Justification for Failing to File Her 
Motion in a Timely Manner 
Ms. McKelvey offers no excuse for the untimely assertion of new claims, and in 
fact, before the district court she conceded that the self-dealing claim was disposed of by 
prior court rulings. (R. 1906.) The lack of justification is heightened here by the fact that 
the pleading Ms. McKelvey sought to file was the unusual vehicle of a reply to 
affirmative defenses.26 A "reply to an affirmative defense should not be ordered unless 
there is a clear and convincing factual showing of necessity or other extraordinary 
circumstances of a compelling nature." Moviecolor Ltd. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 24 
F.R.D. 325, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).27 Courts hold parties to this high standard because 
"[a]verments in a pleading to which no responsive pleading is required or permitted shall 
be taken as denied or avoided." FDIC v. First Nat'l. Fin. Co., 587 F.2d 1009, 1012 (9th 
Cir. 1978); Beckstrom v. Coastwise Line, 13 F.R.D. 480, 482 (D. Alaska 1953). 
Here, Ms. McKelvey did not offer a clear and convincing reason why she should 
be allowed any reply, let alone an untimely one. Ms. McKelvey knew the basis for the 
Hamilton brothers' equity interest—the 1994 FFCL—for as much as 13, but no less than 
two, years before she attempted to assert these new claims to contend that the Hamilton 
26
 A reply is an inappropriate mechanism to assert new claims that should have been 
included in a complaint. Porter v. Theo J. Ely Mfg. Co., 5 F.R.D. 317, 319-20 (W.D. Pa. 
1946). 
97 
"Interpretations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are persuasive where the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure are 'substantially similar' to the federal rules." Tucker v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 54,117 n. 2, 53 P.3d 947 (citing Lund v. Brown, 2000 
UT 75,1J26, 11 P.3d 277); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 7 Compiler's Notes (noting that 
Utah's rule 7 is similar to federal rule 7). 
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brothers' interests are invalid. Had Ms. McKelvey believed that the 1994 FFCL was a 
result of the Hamilton brothers' fraud, she should have (i) objected to the 1994 FFCL at 
the time it was entered; (ii) appealed the order resulting from the 1994 FFCL; 
(iii) asserted in her first three sets of pleadings in this case that her original distribution of 
stock was a result of fraud; (iv) raised her fraud defense when answering the Hamilton 
brothers' counterclaims; or (v) raised her fraud defense in some other fashion 
immediately upon learning that the Hamilton brothers were relying upon the 1994 FFCL. 
Ms. McKelvey did none of these. The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion 
in denying Ms. McKelvey's request to amend the pleadings as a last desperate stab. 
To escape this conclusion, Ms. McKelvey argues that Hansen v. Morris supports 
her claim that she is entitled to assert new claims for the first time during the late stages 
of litigation. (AOB at 41-43.) It does not. In Hansen, the plaintiff asserted a statue of 
limitations defense, i.e. he contended that one of the defendant's defenses was invalid 
because the defendant had failed to meet that statute of limitations. 283 P.2d at 886. In 
contrast, Ms. McKelvey affirmatively alleges specific types of conduct and new causes of 
action against the Hamilton brothers to obtain affirmative relief, and not merely to thwart 
a defense. 
Also, in Hansen and unlike the present case, the court recognized that "[cjounsel 
for plaintiff did about all he could to assert the statute [of limitations]." 283 P.2d 884, 
886 (Utah 1955). "[A]bout all he could" included conducting discovery and 
affirmatively telling the defendants that if they raised certain issues, plaintiff would 
counter with the statute of limitations. IdL Here, Ms. McKelvey failed to do anything to 
assert her claims, much less "about all [she] could." Ms. McKelvey failed to raise the 
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claims in her response to the Hamilton brothers' August 2005 answer and counterclaim 
despite the fact that this pleading clearly raised the 1994 FFCL as the basis of the 
Hamilton brothers' equity interest. Ms. McKelvey again failed to raise the claims in her 
March 2006 second amended complaint after the 1994 FFCL was identified in discovery 
responses and the pleadings filed by the Hamilton brothers. Unlike Hansen, as 
opportunity after opportunity passed her by, Ms. McKelvey did nothing to raise these 
claims.28 
This is not a case in which at the time "defendants answered to this complaint, 
they could not be required or expected to affirmatively plead to something which was not 
even raised." Thomas v. Heirs of Braffet 305 P.2d 507, 511 (Utah 1956). The issues 
were raised, and Ms. McKelvey failed to assert her claims even though she could have in 
her (i) answer to the counterclaim; or (ii) second amended complaint. While parties are 
"not required to anticipate [a] defense," once the defense is presented and they are 
presented with opportunities to assert their responsive claims, they cannot claim a lack of 
opportunity and wait until the case is all but complete to assert new allegations. Id; see 
also Staker v. Huntington Cleveland Irrigation Co., 664 P.2d 1188, 1190 (Utah 1983) 
("The essential facts upon which the statute could have been asserted were known to the 
defendant from the beginning. Defendant alleges no surprise, discovery of new evidence 
relating to the defense, or other justification for its delay in asserting [the defense].") 
The court in Hansen labeled the situation "unorthodox" because there was no 
opportunity for the plaintiff to assert the statute of limitations as a defense. Hansen, 283 
P.2d at 886. Here, McKelvey was presented with several opportunities and simply failed 
to act until it appeared that all of her other causes of action had failed. 
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Importantly, the issue of the source of the Hamilton brothers' stock was hardly a 
"new issue." Cheney v. Rucker, 381 P.2d 86, 91 (Utah 1963) (addressing the need to 
"safeguard the rights of . . . part[ies] to have a reasonable time to meet a new issue if [the 
party] so requests"). The issue had been raised two years earlier in this case and more 
than a decade earlier in the probate action. The only thing that was new was 
Ms. McKelvey's request to insert allegations of fraud and self-dealing to rebut the 
Hamilton brothers' rightful ownership of their stock. This is not what courts envision by 
liberally allowing the amendment of pleadings to address new issues. The district court 
did not abuse its discretion in denying Ms. McKelvey leave to raise new issues. 
3. The Hamilton Brothers Would Suffer Prejudice Had Ms. 
McKelvey Been Permitted to File Amended Pleadings 
The prejudice to the Hamilton brothers is straightforward. Ms. McKevley sought 
to amend her pleadings and introduce evidence of fraud after the close of discovery. In 
addition, the fraud claim would permit Ms. McKelvey to attack collaterally an order 
granting summary judgment that had been entered after Ms. McKelvey had the 
opportunity to fully brief and argue all of her points. It would also obviate the settlement 
Ms. McKelvey asserts that the Hamilton brothers will have to prove the validity of the 
1994 FFCL. Ms. McKelvey's statutory citation in support of her argument that it is the 
Hamilton brothers who bear the burden of proof, however, is inapplicable to the 
circumstances of this case. Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-712 (stating that personal 
representative's transaction may be voidable "except [by] one who has consented after 
fair disclosure" or "the transaction is approved by the court after notice to interested 
persons"). It is Ms. McKelvey who bears the burden of proving that the Hamilton 
brothers' fraudulently procured their stock or that they were engaged in self-dealing. The 
district court correctly ruled that McKelvey was precluded from asserting these new 
claims at such a late stage in the proceedings. She had every opportunity to timely assert 
these claims and failed to do so. 
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agreement enforced by the district court. There is simply no reason to force the Hamilton 
brothers to defend yet another bite at the apple for Ms. McKelvey. 
The district court's ruling should be affirmed. 
9256306 38 
Request for Attorney Fees 
The Hamilton brothers also request that the court award them their attorney fees 
for responding to the first, third, and fourth issues in the opening brief, none of which are 
"grounded in fact" or "warranted by existing law." Utah R. App. P. 33. 
The first issue—that the 1994 FFCL did not authorize the transfer of stock to the 
Hamilton brothers—has no basis in fact or law. The notion that the 1994 FFCL is 
ambiguous was denied by Ms. McKelvey in the district court. And the plain language of 
the 1994 FFCL reveals that the Hamilton brothers should have received "all remaining 
properties" and "assets" of the estate, which is precisely what occurred. (R. 1273; 1251; 
1249.) In receiving "all remaining properties," the Hamilton brothers received less net 
value of the estate than did Ms. McKelvey, hardly a windfall as Ms. McKelvey 
repeatedly asserts. The first issue in the opening brief has no basis in fact or law. 
The third and fourth issues in the opening brief pertain to Ms. McKelvey's ability 
to assert new fraud and self-dealing claims. These claims also have no basis in fact or 
law. This can be seen from the fact that the Hamilton brothers received less than the 1/5 
of their father's estate to which they were entitled. The Hamilton brothers therefore 
could not have defrauded Ms. McKelvey out of anything, regardless of the basis of 
Ms. McKelvey's belated, vague fraud allegations. 
Pursuant to Rule 33(c)(1), the Hamilton brothers respectfully request that they be 
awarded their attorney fees for time spent responding to the first, third, and fourth issues 
raised in the opening brief. 
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Conclusion 
This court should affirm the district court's rulings granting summary judgment, 
enforcing the partial settlement agreement, and denying Ms. McKelvey leave to assert 
new claims after all other claims had been dismissed. First, the 1994 FFCL 
unambiguiously authorized Ms. McKelvey to receive only 1683 shares of Company stock 
and authorized the Hamilton brothers to receive the remaining shares, which is whai 
occurred. Second, the parties entered into a partial settlement agreement disposing of all 
the parties' claims except Ms. McKelvey's request for a declaration of her ownership 
interest in the Company. Based on the correspondence and conduct of both the Hamilton 
brothers and Ms. McKelvey, the district court appropriately enforced this agreement. 
Finally, the district court acted appropriately and within its discretion when it prevented 
Ms. McKelvey from introducing evidence of, amending her pleadings to assert, new 
claims after all of her other claims had been disposed of through settlement and summary 
judgment. This court should affirm on all counts and award fees and costs. 
DATED this 21st day of November, 2008. 
SNELL & Wio 
Mfirkt). 
Attorney for Appellees 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that the foregoing document was sent via U.S. Mail, postage 
prepaid, this 21st day of November, 2008, to the following: 
Christopher R. Hogle 
Richard D. Flint 
Holme Roberts & Owen, LLP 
299 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2263 
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Tab A 
James R. Brown (#456) 
J. Scott Brown (#6191) 
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN 
A Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Personal Representatives 
370 East South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1290 
Telephone: (801) 532-7700 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: ) 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
GORDON DEAN HAMILTON, ) 
) 
) 
Deceased. ) 
) Civil No- 903400101 ES 
) Judge Guy Burningham 
The Petition of Amber McKelvey and Lisa H. Kunz for the 
Removal of the Personal Representatives, Stuart G. Hamilton and 
Vincent C. Hamilton came on for hearing before the Honorable Guy 
Burningham on the 5th day of March, 1993 and the 28th day of 
December, 1993, The Personal Representatives' Motion for Interim 
Distribution came on for disposition on the 28th day of December, 
1993. Petitioners McKelvey and Kunz were represented by Michael L. 
Deamer, Esq. of Randle, Deamer, Zan & Lee and were sworn and 
testified. The Personal Representatives and the Estate of Gordon 
Dean Hamilton were represented by James R. Brown, Esq. , and J. Scott 
Brown, Esq. of Jardine, Linebaugh, Brown & Dunn, Mr. Stuart G. 
Hamilton was sworn and testified, Mr. Vincent C. Hamilton's 
testimony was proffered, which proffer was accepted by Mr. Deamer 
U63 
and the Court* The Personal Representatives also proffered the 
testimony of Mr. Merrill Norman of Norman/Loebecke Associates on the 
valuation of Hamilton Brothers Electric, Inc. which proffer was 
received .without objection. The Court ^ hearing oral argument by 
counsel and being fully apprised in the premises now makes the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Petitioners McKelvey and Kunz are daughters of Gordon 
Dean Hamilton, deceased. 
2. Gordon Dean Hamilton died, testate, on January 17, 
1990. 
3. The Last Will and Testament of Gordon Dean Hamilton 
specifically provided for the appointment of Stuart G. Hamilton and 
Vincent C. Hamilton as Personal Representatives to serve without 
bond. 
4• The Personal Representatives were duly qualified and 
appointed by this Court. 
5. Gordon Dean Hamilton specifically provided in his 
Will that Stuart G. Hamilton and Vincent C. Hamilton serve: 
(a) ". . . free and independent of court 
supervision as the law shall allow. M 
(b) The Personal Representatives shall make the 
shares equal and " . . . that there may be some 
difficulties with making the shares equal. . ." 
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(c) -There will have to be some negotiation between 
my children to make the shares equal 
particularly in view of the fact that the 
corporation would not involve all heirs and the 
house would probably not involve all heirs" 
(emphasis supplied). 
(d) "The Personal Representatives, in addition to 
the powers that may be provided by law, shall 
have the power to sell and exchange property, 
real or personal, for cash or on time, with or 
without an order of the Court, as . . • shall 
be deemed advisable. . 
(e) The Personal Representatives shall " • . . have 
the power to postpone for a reasonable time 
such part of the final distribution of my 
estate as is reasonable in light of tax audits, 
lawsuits, disputed claims or similar matters 
remaining unresolved." 
(f) "The distribution of the whole or part of my 
estate . . • may be made in cash or kind, or 
partly in cash and partly in kind, as my 
personal representative shall deem advisable •" 
6- Gordon Dean Hamilton was aware of the nature, 
disposition and abilities of each of his children and specifically 
-3-
1L67 
chose Stuart G, Hamilton and Vincent C. Hamilton as his Personal 
Representatives and granted to them the widest possible authority 
and discretion, 
7. Petitioners allege the provisions of § 75-3-611 as 
the bases of grounds seeking the removal of the Personal 
Representatives. There are three bases provided in § 75-3-611(2) 
which bases are summarized as follows: 
(a) in the best interest of the estate; 
(b) the personal representatives have 
misrepresented material facts in the 
proceedings leading to their appointment; and 
(c) the personal representatives have disregarded 
a court order, or become incapable of 
discharging their duties, or mismanaged the 
affairs of the estate, 
8. The Petitioners have not sought nor alleged any of 
the bases delineated in (a) and (b) above. The Court specifically 
finds that there is no evidence even offered for the grounds 
contained in (a) and (b) above, 
9. The Petitioners allege that the Personal 
Representatives failed to obey an order of the Court granting them 
access to the financial information relating to the Estate and to 
the Hamilton Brothers Electric, Inc. 
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10. The Personal Representatives provided the following 
financial information as per the Court Order: 
(a) Audited financial statements for the years 
1989, 1990, 1991, 1992 and 1993 (fiscal year 
ends February 28, 1993). 
(b) A detailed accounting of all loans from 
Hamilton Brothers Electric to the Estate* 
(c) A detailed accounting of all transactions about 
the purchase of a replacement boat for the 
company, and all personal loans and/or 
transactions. 
(d) The entire bank records of the Gordon Dean 
Hamilton Estate, including a copy of every 
canceled check and deposit, 
(e) A detailed accounting of all assets and 
liabilities of the Estate, together with 
schedules. 
(f) The tax returns and schedules filed with the 
IRS and State Tax Commission for inheritance 
taxes. 
(g) Copies of the Amended Inventory, together with 
schedules, dated February 7, 1991. 
(h) Interim financial statements on Hamilton 
Brothers Electric. 
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(i) Accountants Report on the Gordon D. Hamilton 
Estate for 1991, 1992. 
(j) Verification of interim distribution to heirs, 
(ic) Various interim accountings from Neil Strong, 
CPA; Douglas Morrison, Attorney at Law; George 
S• Mays• 
(1) Verification that as of December 21, 1992 Mr. 
Stuart G. Hamilton offered to send a plane 
ticket to Amber McKelvey to allow Amber 
McKelvey to look at, review, copy any record, 
statement, invoice, checking account or other 
financial documents of Hamilton Brothers 
Electric and/or the Estate, with such review to 
be for the benefit of both petitioners • 
(m) Various minutes of the Board of Directors of 
Hamilton Brothers Electric relating to: 
i. Football and basketball tickets; 
ii- The purchase of the replacement boat; 
iii. All bonuses (both before and after Gordon 
D. Hamilton's death)• 
iv. The repayment to Hamilton Brothers 
Electric of all funds embezzled by Robert 
L. Stokes. 
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(n) All updated valuations on the real property and 
the current valuation by Norman/Ijoebbecke 
Associates. 
11. Amber McKelvey declined to come to review any of the 
records• 
12. The Personal Representatives offered to allow Lisa 
H. Kunz, provided she was accompanied by Mr. Deamer, to come to the 
offices of Hamilton Brothers Electric to review financial records* 
This offer was likewise not followed through by Ms. Kunz and Mr. 
Deamer. 
13. The Court finds that the Personal Representatives 
were justifiably apprehensive of allowing Lisa H. Kunz, without 
being accompanied by Mr. Deamer, to go through the records based 
upon previous experiences of confrontation and inappropriate 
behavior which would have been disruptive of the operations of 
Hamilton Brothers Electric. 
14. The Personal Representatives were justified in not 
making a distribution of the stock of 20% to each heir inasmuch as 
*. . . not all heirs would be involved in the corporation" and for 
the reasons of pending tax audits, pending litigation, claims by 
Mary Hamilton, the lack of dividends and the personal involvement 
of Stuart G. Hamilton and Vincent C. Hamilton in the operations of 
the company. 
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15- The Court finds that Amber McKelvey, Lisa H. Kunz and 
Tonua Hamilton have had very limited involvement with th£ actual 
running of the corporation, while Stuart G- Hamilton and Vincent C* 
Hamilton have been actively involved for a period of at least twenty 
or more years and have been a significant factor in preserving the 
corporation as an asset for all heirs. 
16- The Court finds that the corporation has historically 
owned a boat and that the 1992 Four Winns Boat is a replacement boat 
owned by the corporation and appears on the corporation books and 
because of the trade-in of the prior boat the value on the corporate 
books of the 1992 boat is fair and equitable and no heir is being 
disadvantaged in his or her appropriate share of the Estate. 
17. The corporation has historically, over a period of 
15 years, purchased season tickets to BYU football and basketball 
games for use with clients and/or family. The Court finds that all 
members of the family have benefitted and that the proper accounting 
for personal vs. business expenses have boen made by the 
accountants. The same is true of trips and travel, including 
Holiday Bowls. 
18. Stuart G. Hamilton and Vincent C. Hamilton have been 
paid annual bonuses of approximately $10,000 before Gordon D. 
Hamilton's death. Immediately after Gordon D. Hamilton's death the 
bonding company required personal indemnification from Stuart G. 
Hamilton and Vincent C. Hamilton in order to allow the corporation 
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to complete the pending jobs and contracts. The three sisters did 
not pledge their assets, but only Stuart G. Hamilton and Vincent C. 
Hamilton did. No bonuses were paid In 1990 as a result of the 
bonding company's apprehension and financial requirements. In 1991, 
after the bonding company's restriction had been removed, the 
corporation paid a bonus of $24,000 to Stuart G. Hamilton and 
Vincent C. Hamilton to make up the 1990 and 1991 bonuses. 
19. The bonding company, because of the efforts of Stuart 
G. and Vincent C. Hamilton in operating the corporation has raised 
the bonding limits from $5,900,000 to $7,125,000. 
20. Other than the bonuses which the Court finds to be 
reasonable, no other bonuses have been paid. 
21. The Petitioners' allegations of bonuses and fees 
being paid in excess of $467,000 is completely without foundation 
and no evidence exists to support said allegations. 
22. The Court finds that the lawyers hired or retained 
by the Personal Representatives for the Estate have not done any 
work for the Personal Representatives individually and that the 
Petitioners' allegations of utilizing estate funds to pay for the 
Personal Representatives' personal legal representation is without 
foundation and no evidence exists to support said allegation. 
23. The Personal Representatives have not purchased 
;rucks for their own personal use or converted corporate vehicles 
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for their own personal use and no evidence exists to support the 
Petitioners' allegations of misuse. 
24 . The Personal Representatives have accounted for all 
rents and have deposited the same to the bank account for the 
Estate. 
25. The Will is completely dispositive that not all heirs 
will be involved in the corporation and Petitioners' allegations to 
the contrary are without foundation or substance. 
26. The Personal Representatives have not started a new 
corporation to compete with Hamilton Brothers Electric and the 
allegations of Petitioners are without foundation or substance and 
are completely void of any evidence to support any such allegation. 
27. All cash, personal jewelry and items of the Estate 
have been properly accounted for and the Court finds no evidence of 
any mismanagement or abuse by the Personal Representatives. 
28. There was no evidence to substantiate any allegation 
of improper or unnecessary litigation. 
29. The Court finds that Petitioners failed to show any 
evidence of mismanagement or any improper utilization of Estate 
assets by the Personal Representatives. 
30. The Personal Representatives have made a full and 
complete accounting and the major asset, the corporation, has been 
managed appropriately and the value of the corporation has increased 
from the date of death of Gordon D. Hamilton. 
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31. All asset or assets have been fully and completely 
accounted for and are available, subject to appropriate reserves for 
pending litigation and tax audits, for an interim distribution. 
32. The Court specifically finds that there is no 
misconduct on the part of the Personal Representatives and that the 
desire expressed in the Will by Gordon Dean Hamilton should be 
honored by retaining Stuart G. Hamilton and Vincent C. Hamilton as 
Co-personal Representatives of the Estate. 
33. The pending litigation and tax audits are necessary 
for the appropriate probating of the Will of Gordon Dean Hamilton-
34. The Personal Representatives are entitled to a 
reasonable fee for their services and the Court finds that the sum 
of One Hundred Thirty-four Thousand Five Hundred Forty Dollars 
($134,540.00) is reasonable and approves the same subject to an 
appropriate addition thereto based upon further efforts, time and 
application by the Personal Representatives. The Court's finding 
of reasonableness is based upon the following factors: 
(a) The time and effort spent by the Personal 
Representatives; 
(b) The necessity of having the Courts rule upon 
and interpret the language and effect of the Antenuptial 
Agreement in conjunction with the Will; 
(c) The necessity of having to bring an action to 
enforce the terms of insurance policies and the outcome 
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thereof, which outcome exceeded several times the costs 
and expenses; 
(d) The necessity of forcing Mary Hamilton to 
return to the Estate the personal property, the cash, the 
cashier's checks, and the need to have any family 
allowance claim resolved in light of the Antenuptial 
Agreement and the Will, together with the determination 
of the validity or existence of the life estate; 
(e) The complex business affairs of Hamilton 
Brothers Electric, Inc. and the pending work in progress 
and the bonding company's restrictions, demands and 
concerns with the satisfactory completion of those 
contracts coupled with the requirement of pledging 
personally all of the Personal Representatives' personal 
assets as additional security to maintain the bonding and 
not compelling the corporation to turn over the projects 
and jobs to other contractors of the bonding company's 
choosing. 
35- The litigation, both that which has been concluded 
and that which is pending, was necessary for the proper 
administration of the Estate, The litigation did not unduly prolong 
the administration of the Estate and the Court's approval contained 
herein of the interim distribution. 
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36. The Personal Representatives' fees and the attorney 
fees and costs and reserves as herein provided were .and are 
necessary to preserve the Estate for the heirs and to distribute the 
same in accord with Gordon Dean Hamilton's directions contained in 
the Antenuptial Agreement and the Will* 
37. The Court finds that the attorney's fees incurred by 
the Estate to be fair and reasonable and approves the fees incurred 
of Eighty-one Thousand Eight Hundred Eighteen Dollars ($81,818.00) 
through November 1993 and hereby approves the same as reasonable and 
necessary. It is recognized that additional attorney's fees will 
necessarily be incurred to conclude the pending litigation and tax 
audits. 
38. The Court accepts the proffer of Mr. Merrill Norman 
of Norman/Loebbecke Associates as an expert in business valuations 
and his written report and finds the value of the corporation to be 
$841,000.00 as of December 28, 1993. 
39. The Court finds the total present value of the Estate 
to be as follows: 
(a) Real Property. 
House, Lots 20 and 21 $235,750 
1/2 of Lot 11, all of Lot 12 $11,500 
South State Street $11,500 
1 Acre in Spanish Fork $12,000 
.13 Acre - Lot 43 $10,000 
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655 South Main (liquor store 
[$45,000], Hamilton Brothers 
Electric [$170,000], commercial lot . 
[$85,000]) $300,000 
Total Real Estate $580,750 
(b) Hamilton Brothers Electric Stock $841,000 
(c) Mortgages, Notes and Cash $120,876 
(d) Insurance $223,000 
(e) Miscellaneous property $134,904 
(f) Annuities and Profit Sharing $56,712 
Total Gross Estate SI,957,242 
40- The Court finds the following expenses to be 
necessary and reasonable subject to pending litigation and tax 
audits : 
(a) Funeral expenses $12,779 
(b) Debt expenses $94,805 
(c) Mortgage expenses $17,329 
(d) Mary Hamilton $290,804 
(e) Administrative and Attorney's Fees $216,358 
(f) Taxes $301,600 
(g) Miscellaneous expenses $3,202 
(h) Reserves for tax aud i t , 
a t to rney ' s fees and appra isa l 
fees $128,500 
Total Expenses and Reserves SI,065,577 
- 1 4 -
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41. The Court finds that the net Estate, available for 
distribution to be: 
Gross Estate $1,957,242 
Less Expenses and Reserves SI,065,577 
$891,665 
or the sum of $178,333 for each heir. 
42. The Court finds that the following distributions have 
previously been received by each of the heirs: 
(a) Insurance proceeds $33,512 
(b) Household goods in kind $5,980 
(c) Cash distribution $14,000 
Total $53,492 
43. The Personal Representatives have made two proposals 
by way of an interim distribution to Amber McKelvey, Lisa H. Kunz 
and Tonua Hamilton. The first being a distribution in kind of the 
real property with a payment of cash to reach each heir's 
proportionate share. The second alternative to be paid in cash and 
deferred cash and payments over a period not to exceed 10 years with 
six percent (6%) interest on the unpaid portion with minimum annual 
payments of not less than $20,000. 
44. The cash and cash deferred payment alternative 
started with a proposed distributive share of $195,000 to each heir 
as opposed to the $178,333 actual amount determined by the values 
found by the Court. The proposal of cash and deferred cash would 
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be the personal obligation of the Personal Representatives and would 
be secured by all of the realty contained in the Estate except the 
Hamilton Brothers Electric lot, which lot would be conveyed to 
Hamilton Brothers Electric in partial satisfaction of the loan due 
Hamilton Brothers Electric from the Estate. The Personal 
Representatives would undertake to sell all remaining real property 
and the net proceeds after selling costs would be disbursed to Lisa 
H. Kunz and Tonua Hamilton upon receipt thereof with the condition 
that if no realty is sold, in any year, there would be a minimum 
payment of $20,000 paid. 
45. Amber McKelvey has withdrawn her Petition to Remove 
the Personal Representatives and has elected to receive stock in 
Hamilton Brothers Electric on the following basis: 
(a) Interim distribution due $195,000 
(b) Less prior distribution $53,492 
(c) Net distribution in stock $141,508 
Amber McKelvey is to receive stock in Hamilton Brothers Electric at 
the rate of $84.10 per share or 1,683 shares, together with a one-
fifth pro rata share of the adjustments of tax reserves, attorney's 
fees and costs reserve, and the Mary Hamilton awards; or Amber 
McKelvey may elect, provided said election is made on or before 
January 29, 1994, to take her share on the same basis as offered to 
Lisa H. Kunz and Tonua Hamilton. In the event that Amber McKelvey 
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does not make a timely election/ she is to receive the 1,683 shares 
of stock as herein provided. 
46- The Personal Representatives interim distribution by 
way of cash and deferred cash payments to Lisa H. Kunz and Tonua 
Hamilton is summarized as follows: 
(a) Interim distribution share $195,000 
(b) Less prior distribution 553,492 
(c) Net distribution $141,508 
The $141,508 is to be paid as follows: 
(a) $37,500 in cash, December 30, 1993. 
(b) $104,008 together with interest at the rate of 
6% to be paid in annual installments of not 
less than $20,000 per year until paid, with the 
payments to be made on or before December 30th 
of each year until paid. 
(c) The Personal Representatives will cause to be 
sold the following real property with the net 
proceeds to be paid upon receipt thereof: 
i* Liquor store 
ii. Commercial Lot on South Main 
iii. .13 acre - Lot 43 
iv, 1 acre in Spanish Fork 
v. 1/2 of Lot 11 and all of Lot 12 
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provided that there is a sale or sales of any 
or all of the real property herein designated 
and the net proceeds thereof exceed $20,000 to 
Lisa H. Kunz and Tonua Hamilton per year, no 
additional payment is required from the 
Personal Representatives- However, if no real 
property is sold during each calendar year, the 
Personal Representatives must pay at least 
$20,000 to Lisa H. Kunz and Tonua Hamilton 
until the balance of $104,008 together with 
interest at the rate of 6% is paid in full. 
Upon receipt of sale proceeds, the interest is 
to be paid current and all remaining funds are 
to be applied to the principal of $104,008-
47- The Court finds that the second alternative, the cash 
and cash deferred payment is fair and equitable and hereby adopts 
the same for the interim distribution. 
'4 8. Each heir is to deed the real property to the 
Personal Representatives for purposes of effectuating the Interim 
Distribution and the Personal Representatives are to grant to Lisa 
H. Kunz and Tonua Hamilton a lien upon said real property of the net 
sale proceeds up to the total amount of $104,008 together with 
interest at the rate of 6%. 
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49- The Personal Representatives are to continue to 
administer the affairs of the Estate, to conclude the litigation, 
the tax audits and are to hold Amber McKelvey, Lisa H. Kunz and 
Tonua Hamilton harmless" from any attorney's fees and tax liabilities 
which exceed the reserves, if any. All five heirs are to 
participate in any excess of the reserves of $128,500 not actually 
expended, together with any adjustments of properties which may be 
returned to the Estate from Mary Hamilton on a pro rata one-fifth 
basis. 
50. The Petitioners have incurred attorney's fees and 
costs with Mr. Deamer. Mr. Deamer represented to the Court that he 
has been paid $3,000 by Amber McKelvey and that there remains an 
amount due for attorney's fees of approximately $12r000. Some of 
the fees have been incurred in settlement negotiations and not in 
pursuance of the Petition. 
51. The Court finds that Mr. Deamer should be awarded 
$6,000 of his fees to be paid from the Estate. 
52. The Court finds that Lisa H. Kunz has in her 
possession a John Deere tractor belonging to Hamilton Brothers 
Electric. Lisa H. Kunz is to return the John Deere tractor to 
Hamilton Brothers Electric. 
53. All other assess of the Estate, except the reserves 
of $128,500 and the Mary Hamilton property, is to be distributed to 
Stuart G. Hamilton and Vincent C. Hamilton in kind, subject to the 
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terms of the cash and deferred cash payment Lisa H. Kunz and Tonua 
Hamilton and the stock to be distributed to Amber McKelvey. 
54. At the conclusion of the hearing, Petition Lisa H. 
Kunz, through counsel withdrew her Petition. 
55. The heirs, subject to the orders and provisions 
contained herein, mutually release each other from any and all 
claims, demands or actions. 
Having made the foregoing Findings of Fact now enters the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Petition of Amber McKelvey and Lisa H. Kunz is 
without merit and there is no evidence to support the allegations 
contained therein and the same having been withdrawn is denied with 
prejudice. 
2. The Personal Representatives ' Motion for an Interim 
Distribution is granted and an Order reflecting the terms and 
conditions as set forth in the Findings is to be prepared for 
distribution of 1,683 shares of Hamilton Brothers Electric stock to 
Amber McKelvey, or upon a timely election the sum of $141,508 in 
lieu thereof, the sum of $141,508 to Lisa H. Kunz and Tonua 
Hamilton. 
3. All five heirs are to participate in the following 
assets of the Estate on a one-fifth basis: 
(a) Reserves not actually expended. 
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(b) The p r o p e r t i e s h e r s t o f n r e a-ura-rd&d t o Mary-
H a m i l t o n . 
4 . A l l o t h e r p r o p e r t y of t h e E s t a t e , s u b j e c t t o t h e 
t e r m s and c o n d i t i o n s o f a l i e n on t h e r e a l p r o p e r t i e s i n f a v o r o f 
L i s a H. Kunz and Tonua H a m i l t o n , a r e t o be awarded t o S t u a r t G. 
H a m i l t o n and V i n c e n t C. Hami l t on i n k i n d . 
5 . The l o t , v a l u e d a t $170,000 w h i c h i s u t i l i z e d b y 
H a m i l t o n B r o t h e r s E l e c t r i c i s t o be t r a n s f e r r e d t o Hami l ton B r o t h e r s 
E l e c t r i c a s p a r t i a l s a t i s f a c t i o n of t h e l o a n t o t h e E s t a t e which i s 
d u e and p a y a b l e t o H a m i l t o n B r o t h e r s E l e c t r i c . 
6 . The O r d e r of D i s t r i b u t i o n i s t o r e f l e c t t h e C o u r t ' s 
f i n d i n g s of a p p r o v a l of t h e P e r s o n a l R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ' f e e s and 
a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s , i n c l u d i n g Mr. D e a m e r ' s , a n d t h e a d d i t i o n a l 
r e s e r v e s . 
7 . The h e i r s , s u b j e c t t o t h e o r d e r s and p r o v i s i o n s 
c o n t a i n e d h e r e i n , m u t u a l l y r e l e a s e each o t h e r from any and a l l 
c l a i m s , demands o r a c t i o n s . 
DATED t h i s . P l ^ ' d a v of J a n u a r y , 1 9 9 4 . 
BY THE COURT: 
OUY Ft. BURNINGHAM 
GUY BURNINGHAM 
District Court Judge 
TO FORM: 
1%0&r-/-JP~??' 
L L. DEAMER 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ^2j_" d aY o f January 1994, 
I caused true and correct copies of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to be served by first-class United States 
mail/ postage prepaid, to the following: 
Michael L. Deamer 
RANDLE, DEAMER, ZARR & LEE 
139 East South Temple, #330 
Salt Lake Cityr Utah 84111-1103; 
Stuart G. Hamilton 
655 South Main 
Springville, Utah 846&3 
Vincent C- Hamilton 
655 South Main 
Springville, Utah 84663 
Lisa Hamilton Kunz 
1430 So, 500 East: 
Springville, Utah 84663 
Tonua Hamilton 
1803 East Hollywood Ave. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108 
Amber Hamilton McKelvey 
1010 Flintridge Ave. 
La Canada, California 91011 
JRBP10X7.1 
{*>( iT^t/ i^w 
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TabB 
James R. Brown (#456) 
J. Scott Brown (#6191) 
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN 
A Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Personal Representatives 
370 East South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1290 
Telephone: (801) 532-7700 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: ) 
) ORDER DENTING PETITION TO 
) REMOVE THE PERSONAL 
GORDON DEAN HAMILTON, ) REPRESENTATIVES AND GRANTING 
) INTERIM DISTRIBUTION 
) 
D e c e a s e d . } 
) C i v i l No. 903400101 ES 
) Judge Guy Bumingham 
The Court b e i n g f u l l y appr i sed i n t h e p r e m i s e s and having 
r e c e i v e d ev idence from w i t n e s s e s , hav ing r e c e i v e d p r o f f e r e d 
t e s t i m o n y and e x h i b i t s , h e a r i n g o r a l argument by c o u n s e l and having 
h e r e t o f o r e made and e n t e r e d i t s F indings of F a c t and Conc lus ions o f 
Law, i t i s hereby, 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED t h a t P e t i t i o n e r s ' , Amber 
McKelvey and L i s a H. Kunz, P e t i t i o n t o Remove t h e Persona l 
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s i s d e n i e d w i t h p r e j u d i c e . i t i s f u r t h e r , 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED t h a t t h e f o l l o w i n g Inter im 
D i s t r i b u t i o n i s approved by t h e Court t o t h e r e s p e c t i v e h e i r : 
(a) Amber McKelvey. The i s s u a n c e o f 1 # 683 shares 
o f Hami l ton Brothers E l e c t r i c S t o c k o r upon a 
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timely election received on or before January 
29, 1994, receive the same cash and deferred 
payments equal to that of Lisa H. Kunz and 
Tonua Hamilton. If no election is received, 
the stock will be issued as full distribution 
to Amber McKelvey. 
Lisa H. Kunz and Tonua Hamilton, The sum of 
$141,508 to be paid as follows: 
i. $37,500 on or before December 30, 1993* 
±i. The balance of $104,008, together with 
interest at the rate of 6% from and after 
December 30, 1993, to be paid in annual 
installments of not less than $20,000 per 
year, 
iii* The real properties of the Estate, with 
the exception of the Hamilton Brothers 
Electric ground, will be sold and the net 
sale proceeds will be paid one-half to 
each, and provided that there are proceeds 
equal to or greater than $20,000 received 
by each, no other payment will be required 
in each calendar year. However, if no 
real property is sold, a minimum payment 
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of $20,000 each is to be paid by the 
Personal Representative to each, 
iv. A lien is to be recorded against the real 
properties to be sold securing the payment 
of the $104,008 obligation and the 
$104,008 obligation is to be evidenced by 
a Promissory Note executed by Stuart G. 
Hamilton and Vincent C. Hamilton 
personally. 
It is further, 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that all heirs are to deed 
to the Personal Representatives all of the real properties and the 
Personal Representatives are to grant to Lisa H. Kunz and Tonua 
Hamilton a lien to secure the payment of the $104,008 balance. It 
is further, 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the real property 
utilized by Hamilton Brothers Electric be deeded to Hamilton 
Brothers Electric as partial payment of the loan due from the Estate 
to Hamilton Brothers Electric, It is further, 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that there is to be reserved 
the sura of $128,500 for attorney fees, appraisals and taxes to 
conclude the pending litigation and tax audits. It Is further, 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Stuart G. Hamilton's 
and Vincent C. Hamilton's personal representative fee of $134,540 
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is approved, subject to said fees being augmented in an additional 
amount based upon a future application to this Court accompanied by 
an affidavit setting forth the time and efforts of the Personal 
Representatives, It is further, 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the attorney fees 
incurred by the Estate are reasonable and are approved in the sum 
of $81,818.00, through November 1993, together with the fees of 
$6,000 hereby awarded to Michael L. Deamer- It is further, 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that all , obligations for 
attorney fees, additional personal representative fees, costs and 
taxes which may result in the further administration of the Estate, 
the pending litigation and tax audits are to be the responsibility 
of the Personal Representatives if the same exceeds the reserves of 
$128,500. The three heirs, Amber McKelvey, Lisa H. Kunz and Tonua 
Hamilton, shall be indemnified by the Personal Representatives for 
any amount or amounts which exceed the reserves- It is further, 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that all remaining 
properties of the Estate, other than the reserves of $128,500 and 
the properties heretofore awarded to Mary Hamilton, be distributed 
to Stuart G. Hamilton and Vincent C. Hamilton equally. It is 
further, 
0RDEBEDf ADJUDGED AND DECREED that all five heirs are to 
receive one-fifth of any of the reserve of $128,500 not actually 
expended, together with one-fifth of any properties that may be 
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returned to the Estate as a result of ^pending litigation with Mary 
Hamilton. It is further, 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Lisa H. Kunz is to 
return to Hamilton Brothers Electric the John Deere Tractor to 
Hamilton Brothers Electric. It Is further, 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that subject to the orders 
contained herein, the heirs are released from any and all claims, 
demands or actions each against the other. 
DATED this %V d aY o f January, 1994. 
BY THE COURT: 
GUY R. BURNINGHAM 
TO FORM: 
GUY BURNINGHAM 
District Court Judge 
/-?-0-? <&<£/ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ^31^" day of January. 1994, 
I caused true and correct copies of the foregoing ORDER to be served 
by first-class United States mail, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
Michael L. Deamer 
RANDLE, DEAMER, ZARR & LEE 
139 East South Temple, #330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1103; 
Stuart G- Hamilton 
655 South Main 
Springville, Utah 84663 
Vincent C. Hamilton 
655 South Main 
Springville, Utah 84663 
Lisa Hamilton Kunz 
1430 So. 500 East 
Springville, Utah 84663 
Tonua Hamilton 
1803 East Hollywood Ave. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108 
Amber Hamilton McKelvey 
1010 Flintridge Ave. 
La Canada, California 91011 
JRBP181B.1 
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